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Challenge and accommodation in religion and 
politics: the Nigérian expérience 
Simeon O. Ilesanmi 
Nigeria's post-colonial history is one of a paradoxical mix. Wrenched from the 
British imperialism on October 1, i960, the gains made since then have now 
been almost eclipsed by the sad expériences of civil tumult, economie 
disintegration, frequent military coup d'états, civil war and a protracted 
mutual distrust and suspicion among its diverse cultural and ethnie sub-units. 
A country of over two hundred and fifty ethnie groups, wifh 80 million of the 
estimated 105 million people distributed almost evenly between two of the 
major world's religions - Islam and Christianity -, and dotted by a formidable 
cluster of indigenous religionists, Nigeria's post-colonial task has been how to 
balance the imperative for civil unity with its multiple cultural expressions. 
In his opening address to the fifty members of the Constitution Drafting 
Committee (CDC) on 18 October 1975, the then head of Nigeria's military 
government, General Murtala Ramat Muhammad, declared: Tt is important 
that we avoid a reopening of the deep splits which caused trauma in the 
country.'1 In a similar vein, President Ibrahim Babangida, shortly after 
assuming office as Head of State in August 1985, inaugurated a seventeen-
member Political Bureau, headed by Professor Sylvanus Cookey, whose terms 
of référence included 'the review of Nigeria's political history, identifying the 
basic problems which led to failure in the past and suggesting ways of 
resolving and coping wifh these problems.'2 
My focus in this article is on one of the problems that have been 
universally regarded as the Achilles' heel of Nigeria's political life. Religion 
has progressively risen from a position of relative obscurity in the 
independence period to become a major rôle player in both local and national 
politics since the early 1980s. While many social analysts found themselves 
bewildered by fhis phenomenon, it stands to reason to expert the situation as 
natural given Nigeria's cultural history and its current geo-political structure. 
A brief remark about these two aspects is in order. First, there is a 
close connection between religion and ethnie identity in Nigeria. Before the 
advent of foreign religions, each locality had its myth of origin grounded in an 
ancestral religious worldview. By the end of the nineteenth Century, Islam and 
Christianity had transformed the Nigérian religious landscape. The 
missiological success of the former in the north produced a population (Hausa-
Fulani and Kanuri) that is predominantly Muslim while Christianity supplies 
the cultural idioms in terms of which the Yoruba of western Nigeria and the 
Ibo/Efik people in the east define themselves.3 Colonialism fed on this 
arrangement and used it effectively to its advantage such that by the time of its 
termination in 1960, the country lacked a common political ground or 
framework within which the diverse religious allegiances could find both their 
freedom and their limits. The grand loser in the new vortex of politics is the 
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traditional religion which, despite its resilience at the level of individual 
spirituality, continues to dwindle in political significance. 
Second is the rôle that religion has continuer] to play in shaping the 
nation's major domestic and foreign policy issues. These issues include 
defining Nigeria's relationship with Israel, the Vatican and the Arab world; 
maintaining ethno-religious balance in the distribution of cabinet offices and 
création of states; conducting a national census that is acceptable to all 
religious constituencies; and ensuring justice and fairness in the citing of 
major development projects in the country.4 A l l of thèse issues are, however, 
usually raised within the context of a much broader and normative question, 
namely, what should be the officiai status of religion in Nigérian polity? 
In the remainder of this essay, I shall offer an assessment of Nigérians 
who have attempted to answer this important question through constitutional 
means. I argue that a near consensus exists in Nigeria on the principle of 
séparation of religion and the State, but that people disagree on what this 
principle entails. After identifying the relevant religion clauses in Nigeria's 
post-independence constitutions, I contend that the intransigence of the ruling 
class to democratize the polity has precluded the émergence of a genuine 
tradition of public debate among Nigeria's diverse groups. In conséquence, 
each religious Community continues to offer a self-serving interprétation of the 
constimtional solution. If the présent arrangement is to endure, both the terms 
in which the religion debate is being conducted as well as the nature of 
Nigeria's political context must be revised. 
An ambiguous discourse on religion in Nigeria 
The fact that in little over a décade Nigeria has had two Fédéral constitutions, 
clearly reveals the fragility of its civil unity and its status as a nation-state, as 
well as the fact that determining the officiai status of religion still remains an 
unfinished agenda. The main contention has centered on how to interpret the 
various guidelines on religion and State contained in the two post-civil war 
fédéral constitutions (1979 and 1989). Section 11, along the Unes of the 
'Establishment clause' in the First Amendment to the United States 
Constimtion, prescribes that 'the Government of the Fédération or a State shall 
not adopt any religion as State religion.' Section 37, subsections 1-4, outlines 
the boundaries of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, thus stating the 
free exercise principle; and sections 259-61 and 272 of the 1989 constitution 
make provisions for the establishment and administration of the Shari'a courts 
at the Fédéral level as well as in states that désire them. 
Two animating principles are commonly understood to underlie 
thèse 'religion clauses' in the constimtion, namely, the principle 
of instimtional séparation and the principle of accommodation. 
Yet, not only analysts but also the two major religious groups in 
the country - Muslim and Christian - disagree on how to 
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reconcile the two underlying principles. I shall examine each of 
thèse principles in turn, and offer my assessment in the process. 
Given the démocratie ferment which originally stimulated a 
nation-wide interest in constitutional issues in 1976, and which 
has continually reasserted itself ever since, it seems plausible to 
see the principles of institutional séparation and accommodation 
as complementary co-guarantors of a single end, which is 'to 
promote and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty 
and tolérance for ail and to nurture the conditions which secure 
the best hope of attainment of that end. ' 5 
The principie of institutional séparation 
In Nigérian political discourse, this principie has usually been invoked not so 
much to clarify the question about 'who should have power,' but more 
importantly, about 'what kind of state Nigeria should be.'6 Geertz says that 
only such clarification can address the central issue of political legitimacy, 
since 'for a state to do more than administer privilège and défend itself against 
its own population, its acts must seem continuous with the selves of those 
whose state it prétends it is, its Citizens.'7 There is a near consensus that this 
is the principie explicitly expressed in section 11 of the constitution, which 
prohibits ail tiers of the Government from adopting any religion as state 
religion. However, in the attempt to unpack the füll scope of this principie, 
two vocabularies or terms have been employed which, with hindsight, now 
appear to have confounded rather than clarified the issue. These are 
'séparation' and 'secularity.' 
Two différent groups of Nigérians seem most comfortable with the use 
of thèse terms, namely, the Christians and the so-called progressive (Marxist) 
thinkers, although on quite différent grounds. Bofh groups also appear 
doctrinaire in their defence of the terms, for in their judgment, séparation and 
secularity are theological and ideological dogmas etched with a constimtional 
precept. Msgr. Adigwe argues that 'the state [as] described in section 10 of 
the 1979 constitution and clause 11 of the 1988 draft constitution is by 
implication a secular state.'8 In their mémorandum sent to the Constitution 
Review Committee in 1986, the Catholic Bishops of Nigeria defended 
Nigeria's secularity as 'the only viable modus vivendi for it to survive as a 
nation.' They went furfher to define a secular state as one in which 'there is 
no officiai religion but in which religion as such may neverfheless be treated 
with respect; and religious bodies and their activities are seen as purely social 
agents within the communities.'9 
In his keynote address delivered to the second assembly of the Christian 
Association of Nigeria (CAN) held in Kaduna in 1988, Bishop E. B. Gbonigi 
of the Anglican Diocèse of Akure, rejected the dictionary définition of 
secularism, according to which it is seen as a 'doctrine of public morality 
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based on the Citizens' well-being and exclusive of religious considérations.' He 
characterizes Nigeria's secularity as 'a form of séparation between religion 
and State which allows for voluntary relationship and coopération wherever 
and whenever necessary and possible.'10 Invoking the classical Protestant 
doctrine of the two kingdoms, Gbonigi défends Church-State séparation on the 
basis of their différent functions. The state's duty is 'to maintain justice, 
security, peace, relative well-being of its Citizens,' while the Church is 
'primarily concerned with the inward and spiritual life of the people 
ordained and commissioned to preach the gospel of salvation.'11 
Bala Usman attributed the confusion over the interprétation of the 'non-
adoption of religion' clause to the imprecise way in which the clause is 
worded, in that the provision does not preclude the State from associating or 
identifying with any religion 'as long as this stops short of adoption.'12 He 
proposes what he thought would have been a better définition of the principie 
of institutional séparation: 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria is a secular State and the State 
shall not be associated with any religion but shah actively 
protect the fundamental right of all Citizens to hold and practice 
the religious beliefs of their choice.13 
Segun Gbadegesin supports Usman's addition of the concept of 'secular State' 
to the actual wording of the constitutional concept, in that secularity is a 
principie that is morally defensible on three grounds. First, it présupposes the 
value of freedom of conscience, something non-existent in a sacral society. 
Second, it encourages respect for individual autonomy; and finally, it 
présupposes 'the belief that human beings are equal in the sight of God and 
therefore are equally capable of approaching Him for their various needs.'14 In 
short, for Usman and Gbadegesin, religion is a personal and private affair, 
and any attempt to confíate it with politics is seen as a threat to national 
stability and integrity, and secularity requires that this devilish force be 
uprooted. 
It is precisely this conclusion that some Muslims find objectionable, 
even though 'standard Islande prescriptions are not necessarily any more 
convincing.'1 5 Mr Justice Sambo, a Muslim judge, argued that there is an 
obnoxious danger in deriving secularity from the 'non-adoption of religion' 
clause, because it implies that 'both the Federal and State governments will 
have nothing to do with the divine religions of their people.'16 The clause did 
erect, in Sambo's interprétation, a wall of hostility between religion and the 
State, which he found répugnant on two grounds. First, it seems to suppose 
that 'human reasoning and not révélation [religion] is the transcendent source 
of law,' and second, it overlooks the fact that 'secular principie has no place 
in the Islande lexicón.' 1 7 To prescribe secularity for a country where 'divine 
religion [referring to both Islam and Christianity] is a complete way of life for 
99 per cent of its population ... is a rude shock.'18 
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Besides the apparent cultural insensitivity of a secular interpretation, Nigerian 
Muslims also argue that to divorce religion from politics is to elevate the state 
to 'a false absolute, an expression of shirk'1 9 (the sin of associating partners 
with God). Justice Sambo reminded his fellow Nigerians that 
the only solution to the chronic vices which have overcome 
Nigeria is for the nation to take a distinctive governmental stand 
on religious, moral and spiritual training of her peoples. ... It is 
only divine religious injunctions backed by those who govern 
that can stabilize discipline, good morals and obedience to God, 
and constituted authority.20 
Sambo insisted that it is not enough simply to provide for freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion without explicitiy writing the moral norms and 
theological principles of the two country's revealed religions into the 
constitution. He therefore made a definite call for a constitutional provision 
that 'once a Nigerian declares for a divine religion, it is the duty of the state 
to see that such a declarant respects and lives in accordance with the teachings 
of the religion.' 2 1 
There are other Muslims, however, who reject Justice Sambo's position for 
being too skewed and theologically imperialistic. Malam Mukhtar, son of 
Nigeria's first Prime Minister and one-time Imam at a Bauchi mosque, argued 
that establishing a religious state [Islamic or Christian] 'is neither realistic nor 
possible' in Nigeria. 2 2 Much earlier, a similar view had been expressed by 
Alhaji Aliyu, the Magaji Gari, a senior councilor and a kingmaker in Sokoto 
Sultanate, who argued that 'the call for an Islamic state is the misguided view 
of the radical academics,' whose views, unfortunately, 'the government tends 
to respect ... because they come from university dons who are supposed to be 
knowledgeable.'23 Aliyu urged the creation and nurturing of a civil 
environment which would permit religion to serve as a moral catalyst, by 
enlarging public vision and accentuating the broader base of human 
community.24 
Thus, the fear of a significant number of Nigerian Muslims is not 
necessarily, as many Christians tend to believe, that Islam is being prevented 
from becoming the official religion, but that the prevailing interpretations fail 
'to foster much more hospitable grounds for the setting of the religious agenda 
in public affairs.'25 In order to harmonize the divergent interpretations of the 
non-adoption of religion clause, we have to correct two misconceptions which 
have obscured the meaning of the animating principle behind this clause, 
namely, that the principle of institutional separation requires a secular society 
(as the title of Bishop Gbonigi's paper confusingly suggests), and that it 
demands the exclusion of religion from political discourse. 
First, the principle of separation should be understood in institutional 
rather than cultural terms. What it seeks to avoid is 'an alliance of civil and 
ecclesiastical power'2 6 that might threaten religious liberty, and not an 
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évacuation of religious symbols and values from 'the totality of cultural life 
and of ideation.'27 Muslims do have a cultural, historical, and theological 
reason to be suspicious of the continued use of 'secularity' as a metaphor to 
conduct political discourse, if, as Soskice has powerfully argued, the language 
we use has a metaphorical force to depict the particular reality we want to 
construct or enact.28 
Secularity, formerly regarded by many sociologists as a synonym of 
modernity, is generally understood as a State of affairs inevitably brought 
about by the forces of progress in history, principally science and technology. 
But the term cannot be said to be religiously neutral, at least, from a historical 
perspective. Peter Berger argues that there is 'an inhérent connection between 
Christianity and the character of the modern Western world,' such that 'the 
modern world could be interpreted as a higher realization of the Christian 
spirit.'2? A much stronger theological defence of secularity is in fact offered 
by the German Catholic theologian, Johannes B. Metz, who regards all 
modernizing influences as positive historical confirmation of the Christian 
doctrine of incarnation.30 
In the light of Nigeria's colonial past, during which 'the Anglican Church 
provided religious légitimation for the polity and acted, unofficially, as the 
State Church,' 3 1 it seems not unreasonable for Muslims to contend that 
Nigeria, as is presently constituted, is neither Islande nor secular.32 The 
Muslims identified many sphères of the nation's public life to illustrate what 
they see as a prépondérance of Christian symbols and values, all of which 
have been unquestionably accepted as the status quo. For instance, Muslims 
portrayed the Common Law tradition underpinning the Nigérian judicial 
process as 'more or less a Christian law,' and they listed such other areas of 
contention where, but 'for our own tolérance the law courts would have been 
füll of suits by Muslims asking the courts to stop the government from the' : 
(a) observance of Saturdays and Sundays as free working days 
which is a favor for Christians to worship without hindrance or 
in the alternative tell the court to compel the Government to 
déclare Fridays as a free working day as well, to compensate 
the Muslims who constitute the majority of the people in this 
country; (b) use of cross symbol for our health institutions 
which is a Christian symbol or in the alternative use the 
crescent as well to compensate the Muslims; (c) use of the 
Reverend regalia as académie gown in our higher institutions or 
compel the government to adopt the use of Alkimba, the Islande 
regalia, as alternative; (d) use of Christian oriented melody as 
our national anthem; (e) use of Christian Gregorian Calendar 
which has no relevance to the need of the Muslims or in the 
alternative use the Islande Calendar pari pasu with it; and (f) 
use of Christian calendar to name our School Holidays, e.g., 
Christmas Break, Easter Break, etc.33 
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The demand for a secular Nigerian state is, from the perspective of many 
Muslims, a disguise to 'perpetuate Euro-Christian culture and neo-
colonialism,' and an attempt to strip Nigeria's public square of transcendent 
moral values.34 In fact, many Christians share this apprehension with the 
Muslims, and it is against this background that we can grasp the essence of the 
contemporary resurgence of religious vitality, erroneously characterized by 
many scholars as 'fundamentalism'.35 Contrary to this pejorative designation, I 
would like to argue that this renaissance of religious interests is a 
manifestation of a genuine intention for the 'tajdid (renewal)'36 of Nigeria's 
public square that is increasingly becoming naked, of an irrepressible urge 
towards 'a re-enchantment of the world, precisely because the disenchanted 
world is so cold and comfortless.'37 
For instance, the charismatic or 'born again' Christians in Nigeria, 
formerly thought of to be self-avowedly apolitical,38 are now actively engaging 
in political discourse. Many of them have been trying to revise their attitudes 
to politics as a result of what they perceived in the country as a 'chaotic moral 
field,' notably, the prevalence of such practices 'as bribery, corruption and the 
degeneration of the moral and material.'39 Elizabeth Hodgkin shares this 
perspective with Marshall in her own study of this phenomenon in Islam. 
Hodgkin defines the 'increase in religious observance and fervor' among many 
African Muslims as 'Islamism,' the aim of which is to employ modern and 
intellectual resources 'to bring Islam into every aspect of human life, political, 
economic and cultural.'4 0 And 'many islamists, or movements of Islamic 
revival,' Hodgkin points out, 'do not see the seizure of state power as among 
their aims.' 4 1 
The point being established here is that what a significant number of 
Muslims are opposed to is the attempt to deduce from the constitution a 
secular principle which posits a rigid demarcation of religion and political life. 
They are not necessarily opposed to a functional separation of powers between 
civil and religious authorities. By saying this, I do not intend to obscure the 
crucial stumbling block posed by the arguments of Justice Sambo and some 
other Muslim reformists, who are presenting Islam as 'a holistic ideology, 
competent to address every activity of life and every sphere of human 
society.'4 2 A case in point is the position of the late Shaykh Gumi, the leader 
of the anti-traditionalist Izala movement, who once issued a controversial 
fatwa (authoritative ruling) stating that in contemporary Nigeria, ' i f Christians 
do not accept Muslims as their leaders', then Nigeria will have to be divided.4 3 
This extreme position has been taken to a logical end by the numerous 
Muslim youth organizations and leaders, many of whom, e.g., Malam Ibrahim 
El-Zak Zaky, call for the demolition of the country's present political order, 
'including the constimtion on which it is based' and they insist that 'a jihad is 
necessary until Shari'a is established as the governing law in Nigeria' and 
'Islam only' becomes the religio licita.44 These perspectives not only make the 
path towards the building of civil unity very difficult, but also blur the 




Yet, it must be emphasized that the concept of secularity is too weak, narrow, 
and confusing to capture the legal intent of fhe constitutional provision on the 
non-adoption of any religion as state religion. Christian and strict 
separationists' arguments, which suggest fhe possibility of privatizing religion, 
failed to clarify fhe ambiguity that has dogged fhe non-adoption clause. The 
1986 Constitution Review Committee acknowledged this ambiguity, and called 
public attention to the fact that the concept of 'a secular state' does not appear 
in the nation's constitution, as it might inadvertently project Nigeria as 'a 
Godless nation.' The Committee explained the exigency of the non-adoption 
clause against fhe backdrop of fhe 'multiplicity of religious groups in fhe 
country,' as well as Babangida's prescription 'to make provisions which will 
make government at every level ... remain neutral, just, fair and even-handed 
in its treatment of all religious groups.'45 In short, the clause emphasizes the 
incompétence of the state in the realm of religious doctrines. 
Needless to say, religion can become a disruptive and sometimes 
oppressive force in society, but confining it to private or small spaces 
increases the potentiality of its explosiveness, for 
whefher one professes fhe Shema of Israel fhe Christian 
credo or fhe Muslim shahadah private religion is 
fheologically self-contradictory. Because religion is about the 
ultimate good of the whole of human life, it will be untrue to 
itself if it accepts the private niche [to which some theorists 
would assign it]. 4 6 
What the principle of institutional séparation affirms is 'the constitutional 
provision which forbids the making of any law, and therefore the taking of 
any executive action, that involves the interlocking of the official functions of 
the state with the official or institutional functions of any [religion].'4 7 The 
issues it clarifies are about the public care of religion and the moral limits of 
fhe state. And this care, ' in so far as it is the duty incumbent on fhe State is 
limited to the care for the religious freedom of the body politic.' 4 8 
There is disagreement, however, on the scope of religious liberty in Nigeria. I 
shall now proceed to review the debate on fhis thème under the principle of 
accommodation 
The principle of accommodation 
Adams and Emmerich designate the concept of accommodation as a 'free 
exercise doctrine' that may be defined as 'an area of allowable and, in some 
cases, compelled governmental déférence to the religious needs of people 
holding a variety of beliefs.'49 They explain further that, in any given instance 
of tension between civil duties and religious conviction (a phenomenon 
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inévitable ' in a society characterized by expansive government and religious 
pluralism') 
accommodation calls for a délicate balance between 
government's duty to promote the cohesiveness necessary for an 
ordered society and its responsibility to honor the religious 
practices of citizens by refraining from unnecessary or 
burdensome régulation.5 0 
The Shari'a debate in Nigeria, which began in 1976 and has remained a key 
issue ever since, falls within the parameters of this principle. This debate has 
been well documented by Ofonagoro, Laitin, and Ngwoke, and so needs no 
repeating here.51 My main concern is to distill the thrust of the main positions 
taken in the debate, and assess fhem from the ethical standpoint of dialogic 
politics. 
What came out clearly in the debate is that Nigérians differ not only in 
terms of conceptual articulation of religious thèmes but also in the 
understanding of the moral responsibility of the state within a démocratie 
framework. Essentially, the debate is about whether, and to what extent, the 
government should recognize and enforce the Shari'a (Muslim religious law). 
To the Muslims, the issue needs no debating if indeed the state is serious 
about guaranteeing religious freedom to ail citizens of Nigeria. It is for fhem a 
fheological and moral issue. The Christians see the call for enforcement of the 
Shari'a as 'part of a grand design to Islamize Nigeria.' 5 2 
A clarification of the way in which the Shari'a has been used in this 
debate is in order. First, the formai or orfhodox Islamic understanding of the 
Shari'a, according to which it is a sacred law, embracing the whole range of 
religious duties, 'the totality of Allah's commands that regulate the life of 
every Muslim in ail its aspects,'53 and according to which the state is 
understood to be subordinate to the Shari'a,54 was far removed from the 
historical expérience of Nigérian Muslims. Historically, in Nigeria, the 
Shari'a has only been applied to issues of personal status, especially 'various 
aspects of marriage and inheritance.'55 
Second, Shari'a courts, following the Maliki school, had existed in pre-
colonial northern Nigeria, which upon the advent of the British and the 
subséquent Anglo-Fulani pact, were defined as customary or native courts, 
having aufhority to, 
administer native law and custom prevailing in the area of 
jurisdiction and might award any type of punishment recognized 
thereby except mutilation, torture, or any other which is 
répugnant to natural justice and humanity.56 
This situation remained, fhough not without some judicial ruptures, until a few 
years before independence, when, first, a Muslim Court of Appeal was 
established in 1956, and later a Sharia Court of Appeal was established in 
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Kaduna, the regional headquarters, on October 1, 1960. Under this 
arrangement, crafted to fit the democratic scheme, appeals from the native 
courts in ordinary cases were lodged with the High Court of the Region 
(which operated the Common Law), but in cases involving Muslim personal 
law (Shari'a) appeals went to the Shari'a Court of Appeal, which applied the 
law of the Maliki school as it was customarily interpreted in the area around 
the native court. Jurisdictional disputes between the High Court and the 
Shari'a Court of Appeal were resolved by a Court of Resolution. Decisions of 
the Shari'a Court of Appeal involving constitutional issues could be appealed 
further to the Federal Supreme Court.5 7 
Prior to the 1976/77 transition program, the legitimacy of the 
arrangement described above was hardly challenged by the South, where the 
absence of the Shari'a was considered normal, thanks to the appreciable 
regional autonomy in the First Republic. Thus, before the preparations for the 
Second Republic effectively began, 'the Shari'a issue ... was not a Federal 
issue affecting the public's perception of and interaction with the Federal 
administration and the Nigerian state.'58 The Pandora's box was opened when, 
during the debate, the Muslims sought what Birai had characterized as a 'legal 
and geographical extension'59 for the Shari'a. 
First, they demanded constitutional provisions 'for Shari'a courts in the 
states, and state and federal Shari'a courts of appeal.'60 In particular, they 
wanted the extension of the Shari'a court system to the southern part of the 
country. Through the Council of Ulama, the Muslims vowed 'to reject any 
new political order that does not recognize the uninhibited application of 
Shari'a law in Nigeria.' 6 1 Second, they contended that the present 
arrangement, which limits the application of the shari'a to issues of personal 
status, was an unjust restriction on the religious freedom of the Muslims, for 
'while not a bit of the Constitution deprived the Christian from being 
Christian, every bit of the same Constitution can easily deprive the Muslim 
from being Muslim. ' 6 2 Areas in which a wider legislative scope was being 
sought for the shari'a included sumptuary laws, economy (especially banking 
and taxation), and education.63 
Objections to the shari'a were based on two grounds, one moral-
political and the other jurisprudential. The Christians invoked the principles of 
institutional separation and state neutrality to counter the proposal which 
would commit the state to what they understood to be an official establishment 
of religion. The Catholic Bishops of Nigeria argued that 'full religious 
freedom in fact and practice' means that 'government or any of its arms' must 
not be 'employed to prosper or hinder any particular religion.' 6 4 What was at 
stake, in the Shari'a proposal, is the 'equality' of all citizens 'before the law,' 
which they contend, would be breached, by the inclusion of 'religious laws or 
principles of any particular religion' in the constitution: 
The Shari'a legal system, which is purely and unmitigatedly a 
religious system espoused by only the adherents of one 
particular religion in this country, should not be foisted on the 
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nation as this will ran violently courtier to the country's 
declared objective of remaining a secular State.65 
Msgr. Adigwe suggested that the entire sections dealing with the Shari'a 'be 
expunged in order to free non-Muslims from the bürden of being involved in 
the building, financing and administering of a Muslim religious court.'6 6 There 
were several others who thought the élévation of the Shari'a to the national 
level would detract Nigeria from having a uniform Judicial system.67 
The second reason for objecting to the Shari'a proposai was the 
argument that there was a 'fundamental ambiguity' in the nature of the 
demand. Laitin pointed out that judicial appeal procédures, 'which normally 
thrive on more general rales, were often considered inappropriate in the 
Muslim context,' because 'the shari'a law is based on a set of particularized 
raies of the Islamic tradition.'68 Muslims were perceived by the anti-shari'a 
groups to be 'pushing for an institution which was hardly central to the Islamic 
expérience.' 6 9 In fact, for many minorities in the North, the Area Courts, 
which have historically claimed to be the judicial embodiment of the Shari'a 
ideáis, are still being 'seen as the vestiges of emirate raie and its oppression of 
the masses of their peoples.'70 
With thèse diametrically opposed views on the perception and 
définition of democracy, how might the rétention of the Shari'a Court system 
in the Constitution be justified? One way of seeing the merit of the présent 
Constitution is to argue that democracy itself permits the considération of 
intensity (that is, 'the degree to which one wants or prefers some alternative') 
as an important measuring factor in a pluralistic setting where each side 
perceives 'the victory of the other as a fundamental threat to some very highly 
ranked values.'71 As several students of Nigérian politics have noted, the 
degree to which non-Muslims preferred a Shari'a-blind Constitution was far 
less than that in which Muslims expressed their demand for an alternative, one 
that would give adéquate récognition to their cultural value.72 
Although a few Christians asked the government to provide for the 
opération of Canon Law Courts for the Christians,73 a suggestion that Muslims 
were Willing to accept ' i f Christians actually wanted them,'7 4 a majority of the 
Christians did not take this demand seriously because the Canon Law, 
prominent mostly in the Catholic circles, 'deals only with rules of liturgical 
worship and very private issues concerning priests.'75 While a culture-blind, 
non-accommodating Federal Constitution might not pose any threat to the 
identity and cultural integrity of non-Muslim Nigérians, it would be too 
homogenizing for the Muslims, sacrificing cultural différence at the altar of 
civil unity. 
The ultímate challenge for Nigérians, therefore, is how to broaden their 
notion of democracy, in such a way as to be able to deal with their conflicting 
demands without compromising the basic political principies on which their 
continued common existence can be assured. Charles Taylor has recently 
argued that the logic behind the vision of freedom and equality rests on the 
premise that 'we owe equal respect to ail cultures.'76 And quite apart from the 
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generic identity of common humanity, each person or group of persons is also 
'unique, self-creating, and culture-bearing.'77 Taylor calis for a more vibrant 
and robust understanding of democracy, one which acknowledges that, 
human identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, 
often by the ffiúrecognition of others, and so a person or group 
of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people 
or society around them mirror back to them a confining or 
demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non-
recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of 
oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and 
reduced mode of being.78 
Anofher perspective on the Shari'a is to say that the constitution itself did not 
consider the principies of institutional separation and benevolent neutrality to 
be absolute, in that they were meant to be understood as logically entailing 
non-discrimination. For instance, Section 16, subsections 1 and 2 of the 1989 
constitution states that: 
The motto of the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be Unity, 
Peace and Progress. Accordingly, national integration shall be 
actively promoted whilst discrimination on the grounds of place 
of origin, circumstance of birth, sex, religión, status, ethnic or 
linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited. 
This particular section of the Constitution thus creates a permissible zone 
wifhin which some particularized demands could be justified, and in this light, 
the Shari'a is neither compelled by the free exercise clause ñor forbidden by 
the establishment clause. 
Third, the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), formerly the highest 
legislative and executive body in the defunct Babangida administraron, 
invoked the balancing of interests principie, perched on the federalist structure 
of the country, to justify the inclusión of the limited application of the Shari'a 
in the country. The Council, speaking through Babangida, explained that: 
We settled on federalism because we firmly believe that it is 
only through this that our diversity can be accommodated. ... 
This administration is determined to guarantee justice for all 
Nigerians of whatever religious persuasión. ... Our society is a 
multi-religious one founded on the principie of indivisible 
unión. Each section of our community must accommodate the 
others in the wider interest of our nation.79 
He further explained that the principal rationale which undergirded the 
decisión of the Constitution Review Committee was the need to avoid the two 
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extreme positions: disallowing the Shari'a Courts altogether (the Christian 
position) or sanctioning the courts at the national level. Hence, the current 
position: 
(1) the court is given Jurisdiction only in matters relating to the 
Muslims' personal life; (2) only states which wish to have such 
courts need establish them, and any state that does not require it 
will not have such a court; (3) these courts will hear cases 
involving only Muslims. Unlike in the 1979 Constitution, any 
person who is not a Muslim will not have anything to do with 
the Shari'a Court.8 0 
Quite apart from the efforts of the state to strengfhen national intégration, the 
principle of fairness and justice is also at work here. On the one hand, the 
moral imperative to preserve civil unity was heeded by providing 'an 
overarching set of values and mores for the entire nation' through the 
élévation of 'common law to the status of a higher law,' 8 1 and the rejection of 
the aufhoritarian position to place the Shari'a above the Fédéral Constitution. 
On the other hand, care was taken to ensure that common political goals did 
not lead to cultural indifferentism. As Babangida put the matter, 
We must listen to the yearnings of Nigérians who want justice 
in their personal and family lives; we must listen to those who 
want government to provide instrumentality and institutions for 
guaranteeing justice to them within the ambit of the 
constitution.82 
Responding to those who might want to argue that this position violâtes the 
principle of state neutrality on religion, Babangida explained that 'it is 
pointedly mischievous and manifestly wrong to equate Shari'a Courts with 
religious courts. If the truth be told, they are no more nor less than simply 
courts of justice to which many Nigérians look for Justice.'83 
Christians have hardly been convinced by this argument, as Babangida's own 
religious identity (Muslim) placed him in the role of a vanguard of the 
perceived aggressive Islamic onslaught on the entire nation. The title of the 
communique issued by the northern zone of the Christian Association of 
Nigeria (CAN), 'Sharia Versus National Unity,' aptly summarizes the 
collective grievances of the Christian Community against the present military 
administration: 
Since the Babangida Administration came to power it has 
unashamedly and in utter contempt for national unity manifested 
its naked discriminatory religious posture through overt and 
covert acts of patronage and préférence for Islamic religion. 
One is therefore left with no alternative but to conclude that the 
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Babangida Administration is the principal agent for the 
islamization of Nigeria. This administration more than any 
before it has built up religious tension in this country of a 
dimension that is capable of obliterating the foundations of our 
corporate entity as a country.84 
Christians alleged that Babangida and his immediate predecessor, Buhari, 
failed to apply the Federal character principle, which requires that the 
'composition of the Government of the federation and the conduct of its affairs 
reflect the Federation, across the board.'8 5 The Buhari regime's highest policy-
making and legislative organ, the Supreme Military Council (SMC), was 
heavily criticized for being dominated not only by northerners but also by 
Muslim military officers. Christians also pointed to the same lopsidedness in 
the Armed Forces Ruling Council, the S M C s equivalent under the Babangida 
present administration. There were several other specific events which 
appeared to have confirmed the fears of Christians that they were under an 
Islamic siege. These included 
(a) the aborted attempt in 1986, apparently with the blessing of 
the Muslim Federal Education Minister, to force the University 
of Ibadan to relocate a cross from the site on which it was 
erected in the early 1950s for a mosques that was completed 
only in the 1980s; (b) the surreptitious manner in which Nigeria 
in 1986 joined the Organization of Islamic Conference; (c) the 
promulgation in 1988 of a decree which turned the various 
Pilgrims' Welfare Boards at state and Federal levels, which 
used to cater for both Christian and Muslim pilgrims to the 
Holy Lands, into wholly Muslim affairs; and (d) the spate of 
anti-Christian riots in the North up to 1987.86 
The use of religious qualifications for appointment into public offices, which 
the principle of institutional separation forbids, is said to be more rampant 
under the military regime. Underscoring the mediating role of democratic 
institutions and processes and the mellowing influence these have on those 
entrusted with public responsibility, the 1986 Political Bureau which was 
commissioned by Babangida to review Nigeria's political history remarked that 
'it is easy for the doctrine of the separation of organized religion and the state 
to be quietly set aside once constitutional guarantees have been militarily 
annulled.'87 Here lies the vicious circle in Nigeria's public debate! 
Conclusion 
I have tried to show in this paper that Nigeria's political history has a major 
religious component. This reality is a distinctive feature of its post-colonial 
existence. The crisis of the proper relation of the state to its diverse religious 
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allegiances is the single most important issue in Nigeria's récent history. This 
crisis has indeed become the plumb-line for testing the capacity, or lack of it, 
of Nigeria as a nation-state to flourish or to founder. The same is true of 
several other African countries where religious pluralism and the search for a 
viable polity are socio-political facts. One hopes that thèse countries will learn 
from both the strengths and the pitfalls of the Nigérian approach to the 
problem of balancing civil unity with particularistic identities. 
One thing is clear from the Nigérian approach, namely, that the 
difficulty besetting the 'religion debate' in the country is more than what 
appears to be the doctrinal intransigence of the religious people. There is also 
the amorphous state which is neifher completely authoritarian nor 
constitutional. It is true that the failure to find a political form appropriate to 
the temper of the varied religious groups is partially related to the conceptual 
différences between thèse groups as to the very meaning of the state and the 
intermittently orchestrated démocratie dream. It is equally incontrovertible that 
the military image has long dominated public consciousness, eroding people's 
confidence in the viability and authenticity of démocratie framework wifhin 
which issues and opinions can be openly debated. As Olupona aptly observed, 
the near éclipse of Nigeria's judicature by the axe's power of military 
decrees,88 vividly illustrâtes the superficiality of constitutional tradition and the 
ethos of public dialogue in Nigeria, and underscores vital areas in which more 
work still needs to be done. 
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